Abstract. We describe a series of new attacks on a CBC-MAC algorithm due to Knudsen and Preneel including two key recovery attacks and a forgery attack. Unlike previous attacks, these techniques will work when the MAC calculation involves prefixing the data to be MACed with a 'length block'. These attack methods provide new (tighter) upper bounds on the level of security offered by the MacDES technique.
Introduction
CBC-MACs, i.e. Message Authentication Codes (MACs) based on a block cipher in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, have been in wide use for many years for protecting the integrity and origin of messages. A variety of minor modifications to the 'basic' CBC-MAC have been devised and adopted over the years, in response to various cryptanalytic attacks (for a survey see [7] ). The latest version of the international standard for CBC-MACs, ISO/IEC 9797-1, [4] , which was recently published, contains a total of six different MAC algorithms.
This paper is concerned with one of these algorithms, namely MAC Algorithm 4. This algorithm has only recently been added to the draft international standard, and was intended to offer a higher degree of security than previous schemes at a comparable computational cost. It was originally proposed by Knudsen and Preneel, [6] and, when used with the DES block cipher, was given the name 'MacDES'. ISO/IEC FDIS 9797-1 provides three different padding methods. Padding Method 1 simply involves adding between 0 and n − 1 zeros, as necessary, to the end of the data string. Padding Method 2 involves the addition of a single 1 bit at the end of the data string followed by between 0 and n − 1 zeros. Padding Method 3 involves prefixing the data string with an n-bit block encoding the bit length of the data string, with the end of the data string padded as in Padding Method 1.
When using one of the six MAC algorithms from ISO/IEC FDIS 9797-1, it is necessary to choose one of the three padding methods, and the degree of truncation to be employed. We consider the case where Padding Method 3 is used, and where there is no truncation (as already noted, the case where either of the other two Padding Methods is used is dealt with in [3] ). Hence, given that the block cipher in use has an n-bit block length, the MAC has m = n bits. E.g., in the case of DES we have m = n = 64 and k = 56.
Finally note that we assume that all MACs are computed and verified using one particular triple of keys (K, K , K ). The two key recovery attacks described below are designed to discover these keys. The forgery attack also described in this paper enables the observer of messages and corresponding MACs to obtain a new (valid) message/MAC pair which had not been observed. Of course, in general, a successful key recovery attack enables arbitrary numbers of forgeries to be constructed in a trivial way.
A Key Recovery Attack
We start by describing a chosen plaintext attack for key recovery which is more efficient than any previously known attacks on this MAC scheme. In a later section we describe a still more efficient key recovery attack.
Outline of Attack
The attack operates in two stages. In stage 1 we find a pair of n-bit block-pairs: (D 1 , D 2 ) and (D 1 , D 2 ), which should be thought of as the first pair of blocks of longer padded messages, with the property that the 'partial MACs' for these two pairs are equal, i.e. so that if
, and
This is what is usually referred to as an 'internal collision', although we call this particular case a 'hidden internal collision' since it will not be evident from a complete MAC calculation.
Given that D 1 and D 1 are to be thought of as the first blocks of padded messages (and given we are assuming Padding Method 3 is in use), D 1 and D 1 will be encodings of the length of the unpadded messages. The attack relies on D 1 being an encoding of a message for which the padded version has q + 1 blocks (q ≥ 4) and D 1 being an encoding of a message for which the padded version has q blocks.
In stage 2 we will use this pair of block-pairs to launch an attack which is essentially the same as Attack 1 of [3] .
Stage 1 -Finding the Hidden Internal Collision
We first choose D 1 and D 1 . Typically one might choose D 1 to be an encoding of 3n and D 1 to be an encoding of 4n, which will mean that D 1 will be the first block of a 4-block padded message and D 1 will be the first block of a 5-block padded message. For the purposes of the discussion here we suppose that D 1 encodes a bit-length resulting in a q-block padded message (q ≥ 4).
The attacker chooses (arbitrary) values for n-bit blocks labeled D 2 and D 5 , D 6 , . . . , D q . The attacker then generates 2 n/2 messages which, when padded using Padding Method 3, will have the form
where X and Y are arbitrary n-bit blocks, and, by some means, obtains the MACs for these messages. By routine probabilistic arguments (called the 'birthday attack', see [7] ), there is a good chance that two of the messages will have the same MAC.
Suppose the two pairs of blocks (X, Y ) involved are (X 1 , Y 1 ) and (X 2 , Y 2 ). Then if
we know that H 4 = H 4 . We call the two pairs (X 1 , Y 1 ) and (X 2 , Y 2 ) a 'diagnostic pair'. These can be used to find the desired hidden internal collision.
The attacker now constructs 2 n message pairs. Each pair will, when padded using Padding Method 3, have the form:
and
where W varies over all possible n-bit blocks, (X 
Note that there will always exist a value W giving this property, since as W ⊕ H 1 ranges over all possible n-bit blocks, then so will H 2 . But, given the discussion above regarding the diagnostic pairs (X 1 , Y 1 ) and (X 2 , Y 2 ), this immediately means that the pair of messages involving this value of W will yield the same MACs as each other.
Second consider the pairs of messages for all the other 2 n − 1 values of W . In these cases we know that H 2 = H 2 . There will be at least one 'false positive', namely when H 2 = H 2 ⊕ X 1 ⊕ X 2 . For the remaining cases, assuming that the block cipher behaves in a random way, the probability of the MACs from the message pair being identical is 2 −n . Hence, as the search proceeds through the entire set of message pairs, we would expect approximately three 'positives' -one corresponding to the case we desire, i.e. where H 2 = H 2 , one where H 2 = H 2 ⊕ X 1 ⊕ X 2 , and one random 'false positive'. If a second diagnostic pair is available then this can be used to immediately rule out any false positives. If not then we can proceed to stage 2 with all the 'positives' from stage 1, and all but the genuine positive will yield inconsistent results.
Note that the cost of this part of the attack is 2 n/2 'chosen MACs' (to find the diagnostic pair), and 2 n chosen MAC calculations and 2 n MAC verifications to find the hidden internal collision.
Stage 2 -Recovering the Key
From the previous stage we have a pair of n-bit block-pairs: (D 1 , D 2 ) and (D 1 , D 2 ), with the property that the 'partial MACs' for these two pairs are equal, i.e. so that if
In addition D 1 encodes the length of a message, which, when padded, contains (q + 1) blocks, and D 1 encodes the length of a message, which, when padded, contains q blocks.
The attacker now, by some means, obtains the MAC for a set of 2 n/2 padded messages of the form
where E 3 , E 4 , . . . , E q+1 are arbitrary. By the usual 'birthday attack' arguments, there is a good chance that two of the messages will have the same MAC. Suppose the two padded strings
yield the same MAC, and suppose that the common MAC is M . Note that the cost of this part of the attack is 2 n/2 'chosen MACs'. (Note also that we need to ensure that E q+1 = E q+1 ).
Next submit two chosen padded strings for MACing, namely
namely the strings one obtains by deleting the last block from each of the above two messages and replacing the first two blocks by D 1 and D 2 (these remain 'valid' padded messages because D 1 encodes the length of a message which, when padded, contain q blocks). If we suppose that the MACs obtained are M and M respectively, then we know immediately that
Now run through all possibilities L for the unknown key K , and set
This will hold for L = K and probably not for any other value of L, given that k < n (if k ≥ n then either a second 'collision' or a larger brute force search will probably be required).
Having recovered K , we do an exhaustive search for K using the relation
k block cipher encryptions). Finally we can recover K by exhaustive search on any known text/MAC pair, e.g. from the set of 2 n/2 , which again will require 2 k block cipher encryptions.
Complexity of the Attack
We start by introducing a simple way of quantifying the effectiveness of an attack. The reason for distinguishing between the numbers c and d is that, in some environments, it may be easier for the attacker to obtain MAC verifications (i.e. to submit a data string/MAC pair and receive an answer indicating whether or not the MAC is valid) than to obtain the genuine MAC value for a chosen message.
Using this notation, the complexity of ]. This is sufficiently high to rule out most practically conceivable attacks. However it is substantially less than the complexity of the best previously known attack as given in [6] 
A More Efficient Key Recovery Attack
We now present a second key recovery attack which is considerably more efficient than the attack just described. The attack is in two stages. The second stage is identical to the second stage of the first attack; the improvement is in the first stage. We find a pair of n-bit blocks (D 1 , D 1 ) with the following properties.
-D 1 encodes the length of a message which, when padded, contains q + 1 blocks. -D 1 encodes the length of a message which, when padded, contains q blocks. n/2 values of X to cover all the n-bit blocks with most significant n/2 bits set to zero (for simplicity we assume n is even). If t is sufficiently large, then for most values of X there will exist at least one tuple (Y, X , Y ) such that MAC (D 1 , X, Y, D 4 , D 5 , . . . , D q ) = MAC(D 1 , X , Y , D 4 , D 5 , . . . , D q ) .
In such a case we know that
If the Y values are fixed for every value of X, each such match results in an additional match, since a match for messages with blocks X, Y and X , Y also gives a match for messages with blocks X, Y and X , Y . To avoid this (it doesn't help us) for each value of X we choose the Y values randomly depending on X.
Now consider the graph G whose vertices are the messages X, and with an edge between X and X when a relationship of the type (1) [9] , then a "giant component" will arise when the number of edges is sufficiently larger than half the number of vertices. With t = 2 it can be shown that with high probability there is a component containing 98% of all vertices. 1 We know the value
whenever X and X are in the same connected component, by adding the appropriate equations together. So for most values of X we know the value
where 1 denotes the n-bit block with least significant bit 1 and all other bits set to zero. 
For c = 4, 1 − t(c) = 0.98. Now repeat the above process but for a set of padded messages with q + 1 rather than q blocks. In this case label the fixed values D 1 , D 4 , D 5 , . . . , D q+1 , and obtain the MACs for messages
n/2+1 values of Z and t values of Y , where the values of Z cover all n-bit blocks whose least significant n/2 bits are forced to 0 (except the single least significant bit which covers both values). As previously, if t is sufficiently large then for many (most) values of Z we will have an equation of the form D 1 )) ).
Now find values X, Z such that f (X) = g(Z)
. Then we know with a high probability that either
This (almost) gives us the desired relationship between D 1 and D 1 . In fact the next stage of the attack can be carried out for both possible relationships. This will not significantly affect the overall attack complexity, since the complexity of the second stage is much less than that of the first stage.
Complexity of attack
It should be clear that finding the relationship between the desired pair of blocks 
A MAC Forgery Attack
We next consider a forgery attack against the same MAC scheme, and which uses a similar method of attack. What is particularly significant about this attack is that, analogously to the attack in [6] , it is based almost exclusively on 'MAC verifications' rather than 'chosen MACs'. As mentioned above, in certain circumstances it may be substantially easier for the attacker to obtain MAC verifications (i.e. to submit a data string/MAC pair and receive an answer indicating whether or not the MAC is valid) than to obtain the genuine MAC value for a chosen message. The attack also requires almost no memory. There are variants of this attack which allow the block W to be inserted between any pair of blocks. Also the attack is only dependent on the block length, and will also work against Triple DES CBC-MAC and other iterated MAC schemes of similar structure.
Details of Attack

Complexity
It is straightforward to see that the complexity of the above attack is simply [0, 0, 1, 2 n ]. In addition, once the 2 n verifications have been performed, each additional MAC forgery only requires one 'chosen MAC'.
This compares with the best previously known forgery attack for this MAC scheme, namely the Preneel-van Oorschot attack, [8] , which has complexity [0, 0, 2 n/2 , 0].
Preventing the Attacks
Before considering countermeasures against these attacks it is first important to note that if k (the bit length of the key) and n (the cipher block length) are chosen to be sufficiently large, then all these attacks become infeasible. In particular, with the lengths envisaged for the emerging Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) these attacks are of academic interest only. However, for the time being many systems are reliant on ciphers such as DES, for which k and n are both uncomfortably small. Thus, finding countermeasures which do not involve too many additional encryption operations remains of practical importance.
Using Serial Numbers
Probably the simplest way of preventing all the attacks described above is to use Serial Numbers, as described in [4] . The basic idea is to prepend a unique serial number to a data string prior to computing a MAC. That is, every time a MAC is generated by a device, that device ensures that the data to be MACed is prepended with a number which has never previously been used for this purpose (at least within the lifetime of the key). Although it is not stated explicitly in [4] , it would seem that it is intended that the serial number should be prepended to the message prior to padding, and this is the assumption we make here. Note also that it will be necessary to send the serial number with the message, so that the intended recipient can use it to help recompute the MAC (as is necessary to verify it).
It is fairly simple to see why this approach foils the attacks described in this paper. All attacks require the forger to obtain the MAC for a chosen data string. However, the attacker is now no longer in a position to choose the data string, since the MAC generator will insert a serial number (previously unused) as part of the MAC computation process. Note that an attacker can still verify MACs on particular messages using serial numbers of his own choice.
Note that the effectiveness of Serial numbers against forgery attacks on the MAC scheme considered here is discussed in more detail in [2] .
A Further MacDES Variant
Another possible way to defeat the attacks described previously is to modify the MAC scheme to introduce an extra key. The key recovery attacks exploit the fact that one key of the CBC-chaining equals the first of the two keys in the final double encryption. We can therefore preclude such attacks by using the key K only in the middle step of the MAC calculation and not in the first and final steps. I.e. we can introduce a fourth key, K , which could be derived from K (with K derived from K ), and put:
However, this modified scheme can still be attacked with about 2 65 chosen plaintexts and 2 64 work. The number 2 65 refers to the number of different messages for which MACs are required, and not the number of different plaintext blocks (which obviously cannot exceed 2 64 ). We now sketch the attack. We are guaranteed to have at least 2 64 coincidences of the form
Recalling that H 1 is constant throughout this exercise (but unknown), each coincidence gives the knowledge that
Construct a graph of 2 60 vertices, each vertex representing an allowable value of X i . An edge joins two vertices when we have knowledge of the type given in the last equation. That is, vertices X i and X k are joined when we know the value of
Because we have 2 64 edges and 2 60 vertices, routine arguments about random graphs (see, for example [9] ) predicts that we will have one 'giant connected component' in this graph, which contains most of the vertices. If two vertices X i , X p lie in the same connected component, we can (by chasing edges and adding the corresponding equations) find the corresponding sum
In particular for most 'acceptable' values of X i we know the sum
However, we still do not know K or H 1 . Now for each guess k for K, and each of 2 4 choices of z, compute e k (z) ⊕ e k (z ⊕ 1) and see whether this equals f (X i ) for some value of X i . If so, compute also e k (z ⊕ 2) ⊕ e k (z ⊕ 3) and check whether that matches f (X i ⊕ 2) for the same X i . If so, then K and H 1 can be determined. This last step takes time 2 56 × 2 4 × 4 = 2 62 . Having recovered K and H 1 , it is then necessary to break double-DES to recover K and K (complexity approximately [2 56+t ,0,0,0] with 2 56−2t space [10] ). This also involves doing the above attack twice, since two pairs of input and output of double-DES are need to determine the secret keys. Finally, break single DES to find K .
Truncation
Perhaps the most obvious countermeasure to the attacks described here is to choose the MAC length m such that m < n, i.e. to truncate the Output Block of the MAC calculation. However, Knudsen [5] has shown that, even when truncation is employed, in some cases the same attacks can still be made at the cost of a modest amount of additional effort. Moreover, if m is made smaller, then certain trivial forgery attacks become easier to mount (see, for example, [2] ).
We now consider how truncation affects the key recovery and forgery attacks described above.
Key recovery attacks. The key recovery attacks no longer work as described. However, as we now sketch, a 2 64 chosen text attack can still work, even with truncated (32-bit) MACs and even with the four-key variant (as described in Section 6.2).
In fact for most of the attack it is possible to make a trade-off between chosen texts and computation. Also, it is possible to recover all keys, or to build a 'dictionary'. The attack complexity is approximately 2 64+3−p chosen texts and 2 56+2p computation, for 0 < p < 32, and with full key-recovery we need an additional amount of 2 56+t computation using 2 56−2t space and about 2 57 MAC verifications.
Pick a block of x = 2 64−2p words X, with the low order 2p bits set to 0. For each X, pick y = 2 p words Y . Optimally these depend on X in a random fashion (to avoid some duplications). Pick four messages Z, fixed throughout. Then (if p = 0 and we had initially 2 67 chosen texts) we have enough information to get the truncated 32 bits of e K (e K (U )) for each 64-bit input U , although we don't have enough information to easily get K and K themselves. If p is larger than 0 then we will only build a partial dictionary. Alternatively, once K and H 1 are recovered, one can break double-DES to recover K and K . At this point, K, K , and K are known and one finds K using about 2 57 MAC verifications.
Forgery attacks.
Truncating the MAC values does not substantially increase the complexity of the forgery attack described in Section 5. For example, if the MAC length m = 32, two known-text MACs (of equal lengths) will be required. In the verification step, a check is performed on the second message (only) if the first verification succeeds.
Conclusions
We have seen that the most effective key recovery attack against the MacDES scheme (with Padding Method 3) has complexity [ ]. This means that this scheme is still better than the ANSI retail MAC, i.e. MAC algorithm 3 from [4] , but not as much as previously thought. In addition a new forgery attack against this scheme (and others) has been described, requiring just one 'chosen MAC'. The use of MAC truncation makes the attacks considerably more difficult. As an example, when used with DES and a MAC value of 32 bits we outlined a key-recovery attack of complexity [2 64 , 0, 2 63 , 2 57 ] (with possible trade-offs between chosen texts and computation). If Serial Numbers are employed, then the attacks appear to become even more infeasible.
